paricCheda 1 - dRgdRshya sambandha bhanga: (part 2)
Continued from here.
The siddhikAra quotes this argument of the nyAyAmRtakAra and says -
अतएव - निरस्तम् Therefore, this argument has thus been refuted.
He says "therefore" to indicate that a similar argument to what he had talked about overrules the nyAyAmRtakAra's statement. What determines the capacity to be useful? He explains further:
व्यवहारयोग्यत्वं न व्यवहाररूपफलोपहितत्वम् ; कुत्रचित् प्रतिरुद्धे व्यवहारे अव्याप्ते: | The capacity to be useful does not mean that in every instance, it is useful. If it did, then sometimes when that usefulness is not manifest, it would mean that the action would have no object.
नापि तत्स्वरूपयोग्यत्वम् ; विषयत्वादन्यस्य तस्यासंभवादिति पूर्वोक्तदोषात् | Nor does usefulness mean that a thing is useful just by itself. What does that mean? Apart from being the object of cognition, there is nothing else to determine usefulness, leading to the same defects as previously cited (self-reliance).
नच - अवच्छेदकात् भिन्नं सहकारिविरहप्रयुक्तकार्याभाववत्त्वं तदिति - वाच्यम् ; अनुगतावच्छेदकधर्मं विना तस्यापि ग्रहीतुमशक्यत्वात् | Don't argue that - "There is something else apart from the qualifier (of the cognition - the object) that determines capacity to be useful or not. The absence of usefulness in some cases is because some of the enabling factors for being useful are absent, not because the capacity to be useful is absent." - because without having some attribute inherent in the cognition (ie the object itself) one cannot determine whether the cognition is capable of leading to useful activity or not.
How can one determine that the reason a cognition does not lead to activity is because there are no enabling factors? Only after the cognition has produced its result can we determine if it has the capacity to produce the result or not. Thus, if the intent of saying this is to prove that apart from the object, there are some reasons why a cognition produces a result and we can use those reasons to define the meaning of what constitutes an object, we argue that it is impossible to determine what those reasons are in the absence of the object itself.
In the satkAryavAda school, it is relatively easy to explain the use of the sentence "he makes a pot". We say that the "existent but unmanifest" pot, becomes manifest.
In the case of asatkAryavAda, even though a person refers to a non-existent pot when he says "he makes a pot", the activity is actually in relation to the lump of clay. The word pot in the sentence by nirUDha lakshaNA refers to the lump of pot etc.
घटं करोतीत्यत्र सिद्धस्यैव कपालादे: कृतिकर्मता In the sentence "(he) makes a pot", it is the existent pot shards that are the object of the action.
व्यापारकार्यतया सिद्धस्यैव कृतिकर्मताङ्गीकारात् | Because it has been admitted that the object of an action, being a part of some transaction, can only be existent.
अतएव निष्पादनावाचिधातुसमभिव्याहृतकर्मपदे शक्यावयवे निरूढलक्षणामाहुरसत्कार्यवादिन: | It is for this reason that the asatkAryavAdin-s hold that, when verbs denoting the action of "bringing about", or "accomplishing" are used in conjunction with a word in the accusative case-ending, their meaning is an indirect reference to the components of the effect, on the basis of accepted usage, which in this case (nirUDha lakshaNA), refers to the pot-shards that make up the pot.
That is, when the sentence "the pot is created" is used by a naiyyAyika, the word pot in the accusative sense is interpreted to refer to the pot-shards being joined up (to form the pot).
सत्कार्यवादिनां तु पूर्वसतोऽप्यभिव्यञ्जनीयतया न कारकत्वकृतिकर्मत्वयोरनुपपत्ति: | With respect to satkaryavAdin-s on the other hand, even though the object of creation is held to exist prior to its creation, as it is in an unmanifest state then, there is no incongruity in holding that the kArakatva there refers to being the object of an action.
With that response, it has been established that karmatvam in jnAnakarmatvam does refer to kArakatva, a particular case ending (accusative), and all the defects that accrue as a result of that (such as the definition failing in the case of God's cognition, and the cognition of past objects, etc.) still apply.
The nyAyAmRtakAra had refined the eighth definition of viShayatva (given by prAbhAkarA-s) next. The siddhikAra refutes that refined definition on the same grounds. He says:
एतेन - 'यस्यां संविदी'त्यादिपुर्वोक्तेऽपि न दोष: संविदिति सति सप्तमी, भास्मानत्वं च व्यवहारयोग्यत्वम्, तच्च सति कारणान्तरे व्यवहारावश्यम्भाव इत्येतदपि - निरस्तम् |
For the same reason, the following argument of the nyAyAmRtakAra also stands refuted:
'यस्यां संविदी'त्यादिपूर्वोक्तेऽपि न दोष: संविदिति सति सप्तमी, The phrase "in which cognition" in what was previously said (that is, in the definition of what constitutes being the object of a cognition) is not defective, because the seventh case-ending "in cognition" is a case of sati saptami.
A quick recap of the different kinds of seventh-case ending:
1) viShaya saptami - to denote an object. mokshe icChA - the desire for liberation. Here, liberation is the object of the desire.
2) adhikaraNa saptami - to denote the locus of a thing. bhUtale ghaTa: - the pot is on the ground. The ground is the locus for the pot.
3) aupasleshika saptami - to denote something close by (kUpe gargakulam - The garga kula live next to the well, gangAyAm ghoSha: - the hut near the Ganges (this is not considered to be lakshaNA in the vyAkaraNa system of philosophy)
4) sati saptami - to denote the linking of two things. रामं वनं गते सति अयोध्यायां जना: अत्यन्तं शोकाकुला: अभवन् | When Rama went to the forest, the people of Ayodhya were plunged in sorrow. There are two activities - Rama going to the forest, and people feeling sorrowful. The arrival of sorrow and the departure of Rama are linked.
The nyAyAmRtakAra says let this be a case of sati saptami.
यस्यां संविदि योऽर्थोऽवभासते स तस्या विषय: The object that is illuminated when cognition is present, is the object of the cognition. What is illumination then?
भास्मानत्वं च व्यवहारयोग्यत्वम्, Illumination means the suitability for activity.
तच्च सति कारणान्तरे व्यवहारावश्यम्भाव: When that is present (illumination occurs), the activity certainly happens when other contributory factors are also present.
- इत्येतदपि निरस्तम् - This too stands refuted, says the siddhikAra. The same problems cited in the previous argument with determining what constitutes yogyatvam, the yogyatAvacChedakam resurface. Apart from the object of the cognition, there is nothing else within the cognition itself that confers yogyatvam to it. However, we are trying to define what is the object of cognition in the first place. So to define the object of cognition using terms that refer to the object of cognition is a case of AtmAshraya, or self referential, circular logic.
The next definition proposed by the nyAyAmRtakAra for viShayatva, is a difficult one to understand. We will have to take a step back to understand his thinking.
When we see a pot, we have the cognition of the pot. The pot is considered to be the avacChedaka, the qualifier of the pot-cognition. We are trying to determine if there is a sambandha, a connection, between the pot and its cognition.
When we have the cognition, "I know the pot", I am the knower, and there is a samavAya sambandha between me and the pot cognition. That is, the cognition inheres (is present) in me. Here, I too am a qualifier, an avacChedaka for the cognition, because this cognition is not had by others. However, even though I am an avacChedaka for the cognition, I am not the object of the cognition. The pot, on the other hand, is an avacChedaka for the cognition, but there is no samavAya sambandha between the pot and the cognition.
Using this, the nyAyAmRtakAra postulates a rule - if something is the object of a cognition, it will be the avacChedaka of the cognition, but will not have any other relationship with the cognition. He says:
ननु - य: संबन्धान्तरमनपेक्ष्य यज्ज्ञानावच्छेदको यज्ज्ञानानवच्छिन्नस्वभावश्च स तस्य विषय:,
A thing, which qualifies the cognition without having any other relationship with the cognition, while itself not being qualified by the cognition - is the object of the cognition.
यद्यप्यात्मा स्वविषयज्ञानसमवायवान् ; तथापि न तस्य ज्ञानावच्छेदे समवायापेक्षा, Even though I have a samavAya sambandha with cognition of myself, I do not depend on the samavAya sambandha to be a qualifier of the cognition. In this case, I am the object of the I-cognition.
The nyAyAmRtakAra talks of the reflexive cognition of oneself and says that in this case, I am both the object and locus of the I-cognition. Here, "I" qualifies the cognition both as the object and as the locus, and the qualification of the cognition by "I" as the object is not dependent upon the samavAya sambandha - ie, upon the cognition being located within me.
ज्ञानासमवायिनोऽपि घटादेस्तदवच्छेदकत्वदर्शनात्, For, it has been observed that even though things such as pots etc do not have a samavAya sambandha with the cognition, they are qualifiers of their cognition.
Why did the nyAyAmRtakAra add the phrase यज्ज्ञानानवच्छिन्नस्वभावश्च (is not qualified by the cognition) to the definition? He clarifies:
यद्यपि च रूपज्ञानं मत्समवेतं ध्वस्तमिष्टमित्यादौ रूपज्ञानाविषया अप्यात्मसमवायेच्छाध्वंसादय: संबन्धान्तरमनपेक्ष्य ज्ञानावच्छेदका:, तथापि समवेतेष्यमाणप्रतियोग्यात्मकरूपज्ञानावच्छिन्नस्वभावा एव; संबन्धेच्छादीनां संबन्धीष्यमाणाद्यवच्छिन्नस्वभावत्वादिति नातिव्याप्ति: |
यद्यपि च रूपज्ञानं मत्समवेतं ध्वस्तमिष्टमित्यादौ Even though it is possible for me to say "the colour-cognition that is located in me is destroyed / is desirable, etc"
रूपज्ञानाविषया अप्यात्मसमवायेच्छाध्वंसादय: संबन्धान्तरमनपेक्ष्य ज्ञानावच्छेदका:, the "destruction", the "desire", "being located in me", do not have any other relationship with the colour-cognition.
Without the phrase in question (यज्ज्ञानानवच्छिन्नस्वभावश्च) being appended to the definition, they would end up as the objects of colour-cognition because they qualify the colour-cognition (destruction of cognition, desire for cognition, the cognition is located in me) while not having any relationship with the colour-cognition.
तथापि समवेतेष्यमाणप्रतियोग्यात्मकरूपज्ञानावच्छिन्नस्वभावा एव; Even so, "being located in me", "desire" and "destruction" are all qualified by the colour cognition.
Whenever we talk of desire, it is always of something. Similarly destruction, it is always for something. Similarly for being located in me, it is always something that is located in me. Therefore, each of those things are qualified by the cognition and qualify the cognition at the same time. Hence, they cannot be the objects of the cognition. Therefore, he adds a clause to the definition "but are not themselves qualified by the cognition" so that objects such as pots etc are picked up, but things like "desire etc" are excluded.
संबन्धेच्छादीनां संबन्धीष्यमाणाद्यवच्छिन्नस्वभावत्वादिति नातिव्याप्ति: As relationships such as desire etc are intrinsically linked with / in association with the items related, there is no ativyApti (they are not picked up by the definition).
ज्ञानविषयस्तु न ज्ञानावच्छिन्नस्वभाव:, The object of the cognition is not qualified by the cognition (they exist independently of their cognition)
ज्ञानस्य घटाद्यवच्छिन्नस्वभावत्ववत् घटादेर्ज्ञानावच्छिन्नस्वभावत्वादर्शनात् | For, it is seen that while the cognition is always qualified by its object such as pot, etc, the pot, etc. is not qualified by its cognition.
The next statement requires a bit of an introduction. The cognition of the pot is called vyavasAya jnAna, and the pot meta-cognition, i.e, cognition of the cognition of the pot is called anuvyavasAya jnAna. "I know a pot" is vyavasAya jnAna, "I know that I know the pot" is anuvyvasAya jnAna.
According to the bhATTa mImAmsa school, the cognition of cognition (anuvyasaAya jnAna) is inferred from the cognition, vyavasAya jnAna. They bhATTa-s argue that one can infer that one has had the cognition of the pot, from the cognition of the pot. We know that the pot cognition is related to the pot (ghaTa avacChinna), therefore it follows that the anuvyasAya jnAna of the pot cognition is related to the pot cognition (ghaTajnAna avacChinna). With that as the background, the nyAyAmRtakAra examines if the definition of being the object of cognition applies to anuvyavasAya jnAna:
यद्यपि स्वग्राहकज्ञानविषयीभूतं ज्ञानविषयकानुमित्यनुव्यवासायादिकं ज्ञानं ज्ञानावच्छिन्नस्वभावं ; Even though the inference, anuvyavasAya jnAna, which has the cognition of a thing (sva) as its object, and is itself qualified by the vyavasAya jnAna which objectifies that thing,
तथापि स्वयं यत् ज्ञानं प्रति विषयस्तदवच्छिन्नस्वभावं नेति नाव्याप्तिरिति the vyavasAya jnAna, which is the object of the anuvyavasAya jnAna, is not qualified by the latter. Therefore there is no under-extension of the definition for cognitions, which happen to be the object of meta-cognitions.
The definition of object, to put simply is - that which qualifies the cognition without requiring another relationship with the cognition, but is not itself qualified by the cognition. The meta-cognition of the pot has the cognition of the pot as its object. The cognition of the pot qualifies the meta-cognition of the pot, but the cognition of the pot is not itself qualified by the meta-cognition. Therefore, the definition of what constitutes an object applies to the objects of meta-cognitions too.
The siddhikAra responds to this.
- चेन्न; मत्समवेतं रूपज्ञानमित्याकारकज्ञानस्यात्मसमवायविषयकत्वाभावप्रसङ्गात् ;
This is not correct. Atma-samavAya (being located in me) is an object of the cognition "colour-cognition is located in me", but your definition does not apply to it.
According to nyAya, 'समवायस्तु एक एव' - there is only one samavAya sambandha universally. Thus the samavAya sambandha between me and colour-cognition, and the samavAya sambandha between me and the cognition "colour-cognition is located within me" are the same. samavAya sambandha is the qualifier for the cognition "colour-cognition is located in me".
Further, samavAya sambandha, which is a relationship between me and the cognition "colour-cognition is located in me", must be intrinsically qualified by both the elements in the relationship (any relationship is qualified by the items related). Therefore, samavAya is also qualified by the cognition "colour-cognition is located in me".
In other words, samavAya sambandha despite being the object of the cognition (colour-cognition is located in me), ends up being qualified by the same cognition that it qualifies, therefore the definition of being an object does not apply to samavAya sambandha.
आत्मसमवायस्य संबन्धत्वेन संबन्धिभूतस्वज्ञानावच्छिन्नत्वात्, As AtmasamavAya is a relationship, it is
qualified by the elements related, the cognition of the object (and me).
घटस्य ज्ञानमिति प्रतीत्या घटावच्छिन्नस्वभावत्वं यथा ज्ञानस्य, तथा ज्ञातो घट इति प्रतीत्या घटस्यापि ज्ञानावच्छिन्नस्वभावत्वेनासंभवाच्च | Like the nature of the pot-cognition as qualified by the pot is revealed in the notion "pot's cognition", the nature of the pot as qualified by the pot-cognition is revealed in the notion "the pot is known".
Therefore, even the pot would fail to be included in this definition of "being an object of cognition".
अथ - यज्ज्ञानं यदीयस्वभावं, स तस्य विषय:, मत्समवेतं रूपज्ञानमित्यत्र तु समवाय एव रूपज्ञानावच्छिन्नस्वभावो, न तु रूपज्ञानं तदवच्छिन्नस्वभावम् ; इदंच ज्ञानस्यैव विषयत्वमुक्तम्; नत्विच्छादिसाधारणमिति नाव्याप्तिरिति - चेन्न;
Therefore the statement -
"यज्ज्ञानं यदीयस्वभावं, स तस्य विषय:, The cognition of that which leads to the cognition being called "its cognition" is the object of the cognition.
When a pot is cognised, it is called घटस्य ज्ञानं, घटीयज्ञानं - the pot's cognition is pot-cognition. However the reverse, ज्ञानस्य घट:, is not used. This is because the pot is the object of cognition, the cognition is not an object of the pot.
मत्समवेतं रूपज्ञानमित्यत्र तु समवाय एव रूपज्ञानावच्छिन्नस्वभावो, न तु रूपज्ञानं तदवच्छिन्नस्वभावम् ; In the cognition "colour-cognition is located in me", it is the samavAya sambandha (located in me) alone which is qualified by the colour-cognition, the colour-cognition is not qualified by samavAya sambandha. That is, this is a cognition of colour-cognition having samavAya in me, not a cognition of "samavAya in me" having colour-cognition.
इदंच ज्ञानस्यैव विषयत्वमुक्तम्; नत्विच्छादिसाधारणमिति नाव्याप्तिरिति This is only establishing how cognition can be the object - it does not commonly apply to desires, and therefore there is no overextension.
The siddhikAra refutes this by saying इति चेन्न. When the possessive suffix was used (यदीय or the sixth case ending), that is denoting a relationship. What is that relationship?
यदीयस्वभावमिति तद्धितस्य यद्विषयकत्वार्थकत्वे आत्माश्रयात् , If the derived noun (taddhita) yadIya (whose cognition) denotes the object whose cognition is being referred to, then such a usage in the definition would make it self-referential (we are trying to define the relationship between cognition and object, and you are defining it by saying it is something which relations the cognition and the object).
अर्थान्तरस्य निरूपयितुमशक्यत्वात्, No other meaning can possible be attributed.
रूपज्ञानाभावाभावस्य रूपज्ञानरूपत्वेन रूपज्ञानस्याप्यभावीयतया तद्विषयत्वापत्ते: | As the absence of the absence of colour-cognition is the same as colour-cognition, the cognition of colour ends up having as its object, the the absence of colour cognition. To explain, the definition was यज्ज्ञानं यदीयस्वभावं, स तस्य विषय:. rupajnAna is rupajnAnAbhAvAbhAva: - or rUpajnAna ends up having rUpajnAnAbhAva as its object, abhAvIyatayA, as the absence of the absence of colour-cognition.
The nyAyAmRtakAra suggests the next possible definition of viShayatvam. He says:
ननु - ज्ञानजनककरणसन्निकर्षाश्रयत्वं तद्विषयत्वम्, Being an object of a cognition is being located in the contact with the instrument which gives to the cognition.
In nyAya, for the perception of any object requires contact between four substances - 1) Atma, the self, 2) Mind, 3) Sense organs and 4) the object. The Atma comes into contact (samyoga) with the mind, the mind with the sense organs, the sense organs with the object, leading to the notion "I see the pot".
Using this, the nyAyAmRtakAra says that viShayatva, which is located in that viShaya (the object) which has come into contact with the sense-organ. The sense organ is the jnAna janaka karaNa, the instrument that has given rise to the cognition. The sense organ coming into contact with an object is termed as jnAna janaka karaNa sannikarSha. viShayatva is that which is located in such an object, or jnAna janaka karaNa sannikarSha Ashrayatvam.
He refutes a couple of possible objections to such a definition.
नच रूपज्ञानकरणमनस्सन्निकर्षाश्रयस्यात्मनस्तद्विषयत्वापत्ति:,
Don't argue thus - the cognition of colour requires the contact of the eye with the object, the eye with the mind, and the mind with the self. If we take the instrument that gives rise to the cognition of colour as the mind, then contact of the mind is with the self. Such a definition could therefore lead to the self being the object of colour-cognition.
करणपदेनासाधारणज्ञानकरणस्यैव विवक्षितत्वात्, Because - by the word instrument in the definition, what is meant is the uncommon cause that gives rise to a specific type of knowledge. The eyes generate knowledge of sight alone, not sound, or smell, whereas the mind is the common cause for the cognition of sight, sound, smell, etc. The mind is not meant here by the word instrument for the locus of the contact with the instrument to refer to the self.
नच साधारणज्ञानकरणचक्षुसन्निकर्षाश्रयस्य मनसोऽपि रूपज्ञानविषयत्वापत्ति:, Nor can it be argued that as the eyes are in contact with the mind, the the mind to ends up becoming an object of the cognition of colour.
सन्निकर्षपदेनाप्यसाधारणज्ञानजनकसन्निकर्षस्यैवोक्तत्वादिति Because, the term contact in the definition refers to the unique contact which gives rise to cognition. For example, the object of pot-visual-cognition, is that which the eyes are uniquely in contact with, the pot. The contact between the eyes and the mind is common for every object seen, but the pot-cognition can only rise when there is contact between the eyes and the pot.
- चेन्न; चक्षुर्मनस्संयोगस्यापि चाक्षुषज्ञानासाधारणत्वेन मनसोऽपि चाक्षुषज्ञानविषयत्वापत्ते:, परोक्षविषये अव्याप्तेश्च |
The siddhikAra says - no.
As the contact between the eyes and the mind is a unique cause for visual-cognition, the mind too becomes the object for all visual-cognition. Further, in the case of indirect cognitions such as inference etc, there is no contact between the sense organ and the object of inference, so this definition will not apply to the objects of indirect cognitions.
नच - तत्र लिङ्गज्ञानं करणम्, तत्र च लिङ्गिन: तद्व्याप्तत्वं संबन्धोऽस्तीति - वाच्यम् ; Nor can it be said that the instrument in the case of inference etc is the cognition of the linga (hetu) in invariable concomitance, vyApti, with the lingi (sAdhya).
The object of the inference is fire. The instrument that gives rise to the inference is the invariable concomitance. The word लिङ्गं here refers to the hetu which is present in both the invariable concomitance and the paksha. The लिङ्गि is the sAdhya of the inference. The relation here is that the lingi is concomitant with the linga.
लिङ्गस्यापि स्वज्ञानसंबन्धित्वेनानुमितिविषयत्वापत्ते: | The hetu also ends up becoming the object of the inferential cognition as well - because, just like the sAdhya is concomitant with the hetu, the hetu is concomitant with itself too.
नचानुमितौ तद्व्याप्ततारूपसंबन्ध एव विषयतानियामक:,
Nor can it be argued that the factor that determines being an object of an inferential cognition is limited to that which appears to be invariably concomitant in the inference.
The inferential cognition is वह्निव्याप्य धूमवान् पर्वतः - the mountain is pervaded by smoke which is invariably concomitant with fire. When the inference arises, it arises because the invariable concomitance of the smoke with fire is what is invoked. The invariable concomitance of the smoke with itself, while true, is not what is invoked, giving rise to the inference of fire.
व्यापकतावच्छेदकव्यापकसंबन्धादीनाम् विषयत्वापत्ते: | To this the siddhikAra says no, because if you argue thus, the qualifiers that are necessary for being the inferred entity (vyApakatAvacChedakam) and the relation with the inferred entity (vyApakasambandha) would also end up the objects of the inferential cognition.
To explain - the fire (vyApaka) and the mountain have samyoga sambandha (are in contact). That they are in contact is known as a result of the concomitance. Similarly, the fire (vyApaka) that is inferred by the inference is known to be endowed with fire-ness (vyApakatAvacChedakam). If we say that everything that is known through the concomitance ends up the object of the concomitance, then the fire's contact with the mountain and the fire-ness of the fire would also end up as objects of the cognition.
In nyAya, cognition is of two types - cognition that arises (janya jnAna) and cognition that is eternal (nitya jnAna, i.e. Ishvara's cognition). Everything is an object to Ishvara's cognition. As it is eternal, it cannot have a cause, thus, if being an object is defined in terms of the accusative case, Ishvara's cognition will end up not having an object. To avoid this, the nyAyAmRtakAra postulates some refinements.
This is based on the definition of earth, prithivI. When heat is applied to earth, there is a change in its colour. Thus a definition of earth is postulated पाकजरूपवत्त्वं पृथिवीत्वम् - that which is endowed with colour born from heat is earth. However, it is said that a conch when subject to heat, does not change colour. However, the conch too is a product of earth. That being the case, to avoid the definition not applying to cases of earth which do not change colour, the logician defines earth as पाकजरूपसमानाधिकरणजातिमत्त्वम् - that which is endowed with a universal which is colocated with a colour born out of heat. However, this too suffers from the flaw that dravyatva, or substance-ness is also colocated with prithivItvam - and the definition can be extended to dravyatva. However dravyatva applies to water and the other elements also. Thus this is a case of over-extension. To avoid this, the phrase द्रव्यत्व व्याप्य (that universal which is a subset of dravyatva, substance-ness) is added to the definition. That is, every instance of the earth element is a substance, but every substance is not earth - thus by saying द्रव्यत्व व्याप्य, what is meant is a subset of substance-ness.
A similar approach is taken by the nyAyAmRtakAra. A pot becomes the object of a cognition born from the eyes. The object of the cognition is the avacChedaka or qualifier of the cognition. That is common to both our perception and Ishvara's perception.
नच - ज्ञानकरणसन्निकर्षसमानाधिकरणो ज्ञानावच्छेदकत्वसाक्षाद्व्याप्यधर्मो विषयत्वम्, इदंच नित्यपरोक्षसाधरणिमिति - वाच्यम् ;
The siddhikAra says: don't argue thus - "That which is colocated with the contact with the instrument of cognition, and that which is a direct subset of the qualifier-ness of the cognition is viShayatva, being the object of cognition. This definition applies commonly to cognitions of those objects which are eternally beyond the range of perception".
Why does the nyAyAmRtakAra adds the phrase "direct subset"? The pot is the qualifier (avacChedaka) to the pot-cognition. The attribute of "being the qualifier of cognition" (jnAna avacChedakatva) is present in the pot. Being a pot (ghaTatva) is a subset of jnAna avacChedakatva. That is, cognitions objectify many things, some of which are pots. Thus ghaTatva is present in a subset of those items that have jnAna avacChedakatva.
The nyAyA process of cognition, as we have discussed, is that the Atma and mind have samyoga, the mind and the sense organs have samyoga, the sense organs and the object have samyoga - this leads to the cognition "I see the object". The object is said to be jnAna avacChedaka, a qualifier of cognition. As the mind is in contact with the senses which are in contact with the object, it can also be said that that manatva is also a jnAna avacChedaka through a remote contact with the object. Therefore, to exclude chakshutva, manatva, Atmatva etc, the nyAyAmRtakAra says sAkshAt vyApya dharma (direct subset).
The siddhikAra responds to this by sayihg:
वस्तुत्वादिकमेव विषयत्वमित्यापत्ते:, All this means is that being a thing is being an object of cognition,
ज्ञानावच्छेदकत्वस्य रूपज्ञानाविषये समवायेऽपि सत्त्वेनातिव्याप्तेश्च | In the cognition of colour, as the samavAya too has the attribute of being the qualifier of the cognition, it will mean that the samavAya also ends up as an object of the cognition under this definition, which is a case of ativyApti, or over-extension.
In nyAya, if no sambandha can be defined between two entities which are somehow related, they classify the relation as a svarUpa sambandha. For example, the relationship between the pot and its absence is classified as svarUpa sambandha. Without a relationship between the pot and its absence, it would not be possible to claim "There is no pot here", but the relationship between the two cannot be classified into any other form of relationship. Hence, a new relationship called svarUpasambandha is postulated. The definition of svarUpasambandha is that it is indefinable, unclassifiable into any of the other types of sambandha.
नच - ज्ञानज्ञेययो: स्वरुपसंबन्ध एव विषयत्वमिति - वाच्यम् ; The siddhikAra says that one cannot argue that the relationship between cognition and its object is a case of svarUpasambandha either.
असिद्धे: | Because what is svarUpa sambandha is itself not proven.
तथाहि - स्वरूपसंबन्ध इत्यस्य सवरूपं संबन्ध इत्यर्थत्वे संयोगादावतिव्याप्ति:, If svarUpasambandha means that the nature (svarUpa) of it is that it is a relationship (sambandha), then such a definition would over-extend to samyogasambandha and samvavAya sambandha (ie if the svarUpa refers to samyoga and samavayAya then svarUpa sambandha would end up meaning samyoga sambandha and samavAya sambandha) - however samyoga and samavAya are not considered to be svarUpasambandha.
नच तदुभयान्यत्वं विशेषणम् ; Nor can it be said that svarUpasambandha is something other than the two objects being related.
हिमवद्विन्ध्ययोरपि स्वरूपसंबन्धापत्ते:, If it is simply something other than the two objects, then two unrelated entities like the Himalaya-s and the Vindhya mountain range can also be said to be connected by svarUpasambandha.
To remedy this, the pp says:
संबन्धान्तरमन्तरेण विशिष्टप्रतीतिजननयोग्यत्वं स्वरुपसंबन्ध इति चेन्न; If it is said that svarUpasambandha is that which leads to a cognition that two objects are related when there is no other relation between them.
आत्मानं जानामीत्यत्राव्याप्ते:, Because this definition would not apply to the cognition "I know myself", because the self is both the object of the cognition and the locus of the cognition - thus one cannot say that the cognition and its object have svarUpasambandha wherein no other sambandha is possible (because the locus - located relationship between the cognition and the self is present).
तत्र संबन्धान्तरस्य समवायस्यैव सत्त्वात् Because there is another sambandha, samavAya that is present.
अतीन्द्रियाभावादावव्याप्तेश्च, Moreover, this definition would also not apply to the absence of objects that are beyond the senses etc.
dharma / adharma are beyond the senses. The pot does not have dharma / adharma. The absence of adharma is present in the pot. There is no sambandha possible between this cognition and the absence of adharma. Therefore there is avyApti of this definition in the absence of atIndriya.
न हि तस्य विशिष्टप्रतितिजननयोग्यत्वे मानमस्ति | There is absolutely no basis to claim that they (the absence of objects beyond the senses) are capable of generating a cognition of relation.
अन्यथा तेन विशिष्टप्रत्ययजननापत्ते: | Otherwise we would be able to say so.
What is the relationship that you are referring to here?
किंच विशिष्टप्रतीतिजननयोग्यत्वं धर्मो वा संबन्ध:, तादृशस्वरूपद्वयमेव वा | 1) Is the relationship the attribute of being capable of generating a cognition of relation? 2) Or are the cognition and its object themselves together the relationship?
आद्ये स्वरूपस्य संबन्धत्वव्याघात:, In the first alternative, that the svarUpa of the cognition and its object (i.e., the cognition and the object themselves) are related is contradicted
प्रतीतिघटितस्यास्यचाक्षुषादिज्ञानागोचरत्वप्रसङ्गश्च | As the definition of svarUpa sambandha definition is inextricably linked with the cognition (of relation), the visual cognition of svarUpa sambandha would not be possible.
When the naiyyAyika postulates a svarUpa sambandha between the ground and the absence of the pot, he does so because of the cognition "I don't see the pot on the ground" - that is, the svarUpasambandha between the ground and the pot-absence is itself perceptible. Now, when svarUpasambandha between the ground and the absence of the pot is defined to be a capacity to generate a cognition of relation, then as that capacity is not perceptible, the svarUpasambandha would not be perceptible. However, as we have seen, the svarUpasambandha between the ground and the pot-absence is perceptible according to the naiyyAyika. Therefore, we will have a situation where the definition of svarUpasambandha will not apply in situations where the svarUpasambandha is visually perceptible.
न द्वितीय:, अननुगमात् | It cannot be the second alternative either, because if the two entities are themselves the svarUpasambandha, then as there are an infinite pairs of objects possible, there would no common definition of svarUpasambandha universally.
Continued here.
The siddhikAra quotes this argument of the nyAyAmRtakAra and says -
अतएव - निरस्तम् Therefore, this argument has thus been refuted.
He says "therefore" to indicate that a similar argument to what he had talked about overrules the nyAyAmRtakAra's statement. What determines the capacity to be useful? He explains further:
व्यवहारयोग्यत्वं न व्यवहाररूपफलोपहितत्वम् ; कुत्रचित् प्रतिरुद्धे व्यवहारे अव्याप्ते: | The capacity to be useful does not mean that in every instance, it is useful. If it did, then sometimes when that usefulness is not manifest, it would mean that the action would have no object.
नापि तत्स्वरूपयोग्यत्वम् ; विषयत्वादन्यस्य तस्यासंभवादिति पूर्वोक्तदोषात् | Nor does usefulness mean that a thing is useful just by itself. What does that mean? Apart from being the object of cognition, there is nothing else to determine usefulness, leading to the same defects as previously cited (self-reliance).
नच - अवच्छेदकात् भिन्नं सहकारिविरहप्रयुक्तकार्याभाववत्त्वं तदिति - वाच्यम् ; अनुगतावच्छेदकधर्मं विना तस्यापि ग्रहीतुमशक्यत्वात् | Don't argue that - "There is something else apart from the qualifier (of the cognition - the object) that determines capacity to be useful or not. The absence of usefulness in some cases is because some of the enabling factors for being useful are absent, not because the capacity to be useful is absent." - because without having some attribute inherent in the cognition (ie the object itself) one cannot determine whether the cognition is capable of leading to useful activity or not.
How can one determine that the reason a cognition does not lead to activity is because there are no enabling factors? Only after the cognition has produced its result can we determine if it has the capacity to produce the result or not. Thus, if the intent of saying this is to prove that apart from the object, there are some reasons why a cognition produces a result and we can use those reasons to define the meaning of what constitutes an object, we argue that it is impossible to determine what those reasons are in the absence of the object itself.
In the satkAryavAda school, it is relatively easy to explain the use of the sentence "he makes a pot". We say that the "existent but unmanifest" pot, becomes manifest.
In the case of asatkAryavAda, even though a person refers to a non-existent pot when he says "he makes a pot", the activity is actually in relation to the lump of clay. The word pot in the sentence by nirUDha lakshaNA refers to the lump of pot etc.
घटं करोतीत्यत्र सिद्धस्यैव कपालादे: कृतिकर्मता In the sentence "(he) makes a pot", it is the existent pot shards that are the object of the action.
व्यापारकार्यतया सिद्धस्यैव कृतिकर्मताङ्गीकारात् | Because it has been admitted that the object of an action, being a part of some transaction, can only be existent.
अतएव निष्पादनावाचिधातुसमभिव्याहृतकर्मपदे शक्यावयवे निरूढलक्षणामाहुरसत्कार्यवादिन: | It is for this reason that the asatkAryavAdin-s hold that, when verbs denoting the action of "bringing about", or "accomplishing" are used in conjunction with a word in the accusative case-ending, their meaning is an indirect reference to the components of the effect, on the basis of accepted usage, which in this case (nirUDha lakshaNA), refers to the pot-shards that make up the pot.
That is, when the sentence "the pot is created" is used by a naiyyAyika, the word pot in the accusative sense is interpreted to refer to the pot-shards being joined up (to form the pot).
सत्कार्यवादिनां तु पूर्वसतोऽप्यभिव्यञ्जनीयतया न कारकत्वकृतिकर्मत्वयोरनुपपत्ति: | With respect to satkaryavAdin-s on the other hand, even though the object of creation is held to exist prior to its creation, as it is in an unmanifest state then, there is no incongruity in holding that the kArakatva there refers to being the object of an action.
With that response, it has been established that karmatvam in jnAnakarmatvam does refer to kArakatva, a particular case ending (accusative), and all the defects that accrue as a result of that (such as the definition failing in the case of God's cognition, and the cognition of past objects, etc.) still apply.
The nyAyAmRtakAra had refined the eighth definition of viShayatva (given by prAbhAkarA-s) next. The siddhikAra refutes that refined definition on the same grounds. He says:
एतेन - 'यस्यां संविदी'त्यादिपुर्वोक्तेऽपि न दोष: संविदिति सति सप्तमी, भास्मानत्वं च व्यवहारयोग्यत्वम्, तच्च सति कारणान्तरे व्यवहारावश्यम्भाव इत्येतदपि - निरस्तम् |
For the same reason, the following argument of the nyAyAmRtakAra also stands refuted:
'यस्यां संविदी'त्यादिपूर्वोक्तेऽपि न दोष: संविदिति सति सप्तमी, The phrase "in which cognition" in what was previously said (that is, in the definition of what constitutes being the object of a cognition) is not defective, because the seventh case-ending "in cognition" is a case of sati saptami.
A quick recap of the different kinds of seventh-case ending:
1) viShaya saptami - to denote an object. mokshe icChA - the desire for liberation. Here, liberation is the object of the desire.
2) adhikaraNa saptami - to denote the locus of a thing. bhUtale ghaTa: - the pot is on the ground. The ground is the locus for the pot.
3) aupasleshika saptami - to denote something close by (kUpe gargakulam - The garga kula live next to the well, gangAyAm ghoSha: - the hut near the Ganges (this is not considered to be lakshaNA in the vyAkaraNa system of philosophy)
4) sati saptami - to denote the linking of two things. रामं वनं गते सति अयोध्यायां जना: अत्यन्तं शोकाकुला: अभवन् | When Rama went to the forest, the people of Ayodhya were plunged in sorrow. There are two activities - Rama going to the forest, and people feeling sorrowful. The arrival of sorrow and the departure of Rama are linked.
The nyAyAmRtakAra says let this be a case of sati saptami.
यस्यां संविदि योऽर्थोऽवभासते स तस्या विषय: The object that is illuminated when cognition is present, is the object of the cognition. What is illumination then?
भास्मानत्वं च व्यवहारयोग्यत्वम्, Illumination means the suitability for activity.
तच्च सति कारणान्तरे व्यवहारावश्यम्भाव: When that is present (illumination occurs), the activity certainly happens when other contributory factors are also present.
- इत्येतदपि निरस्तम् - This too stands refuted, says the siddhikAra. The same problems cited in the previous argument with determining what constitutes yogyatvam, the yogyatAvacChedakam resurface. Apart from the object of the cognition, there is nothing else within the cognition itself that confers yogyatvam to it. However, we are trying to define what is the object of cognition in the first place. So to define the object of cognition using terms that refer to the object of cognition is a case of AtmAshraya, or self referential, circular logic.
The next definition proposed by the nyAyAmRtakAra for viShayatva, is a difficult one to understand. We will have to take a step back to understand his thinking.
When we see a pot, we have the cognition of the pot. The pot is considered to be the avacChedaka, the qualifier of the pot-cognition. We are trying to determine if there is a sambandha, a connection, between the pot and its cognition.
When we have the cognition, "I know the pot", I am the knower, and there is a samavAya sambandha between me and the pot cognition. That is, the cognition inheres (is present) in me. Here, I too am a qualifier, an avacChedaka for the cognition, because this cognition is not had by others. However, even though I am an avacChedaka for the cognition, I am not the object of the cognition. The pot, on the other hand, is an avacChedaka for the cognition, but there is no samavAya sambandha between the pot and the cognition.
Using this, the nyAyAmRtakAra postulates a rule - if something is the object of a cognition, it will be the avacChedaka of the cognition, but will not have any other relationship with the cognition. He says:
ननु - य: संबन्धान्तरमनपेक्ष्य यज्ज्ञानावच्छेदको यज्ज्ञानानवच्छिन्नस्वभावश्च स तस्य विषय:,
A thing, which qualifies the cognition without having any other relationship with the cognition, while itself not being qualified by the cognition - is the object of the cognition.
यद्यप्यात्मा स्वविषयज्ञानसमवायवान् ; तथापि न तस्य ज्ञानावच्छेदे समवायापेक्षा, Even though I have a samavAya sambandha with cognition of myself, I do not depend on the samavAya sambandha to be a qualifier of the cognition. In this case, I am the object of the I-cognition.
The nyAyAmRtakAra talks of the reflexive cognition of oneself and says that in this case, I am both the object and locus of the I-cognition. Here, "I" qualifies the cognition both as the object and as the locus, and the qualification of the cognition by "I" as the object is not dependent upon the samavAya sambandha - ie, upon the cognition being located within me.
ज्ञानासमवायिनोऽपि घटादेस्तदवच्छेदकत्वदर्शनात्, For, it has been observed that even though things such as pots etc do not have a samavAya sambandha with the cognition, they are qualifiers of their cognition.
Why did the nyAyAmRtakAra add the phrase यज्ज्ञानानवच्छिन्नस्वभावश्च (is not qualified by the cognition) to the definition? He clarifies:
यद्यपि च रूपज्ञानं मत्समवेतं ध्वस्तमिष्टमित्यादौ रूपज्ञानाविषया अप्यात्मसमवायेच्छाध्वंसादय: संबन्धान्तरमनपेक्ष्य ज्ञानावच्छेदका:, तथापि समवेतेष्यमाणप्रतियोग्यात्मकरूपज्ञानावच्छिन्नस्वभावा एव; संबन्धेच्छादीनां संबन्धीष्यमाणाद्यवच्छिन्नस्वभावत्वादिति नातिव्याप्ति: |
यद्यपि च रूपज्ञानं मत्समवेतं ध्वस्तमिष्टमित्यादौ Even though it is possible for me to say "the colour-cognition that is located in me is destroyed / is desirable, etc"
रूपज्ञानाविषया अप्यात्मसमवायेच्छाध्वंसादय: संबन्धान्तरमनपेक्ष्य ज्ञानावच्छेदका:, the "destruction", the "desire", "being located in me", do not have any other relationship with the colour-cognition.
Without the phrase in question (यज्ज्ञानानवच्छिन्नस्वभावश्च) being appended to the definition, they would end up as the objects of colour-cognition because they qualify the colour-cognition (destruction of cognition, desire for cognition, the cognition is located in me) while not having any relationship with the colour-cognition.
तथापि समवेतेष्यमाणप्रतियोग्यात्मकरूपज्ञानावच्छिन्नस्वभावा एव; Even so, "being located in me", "desire" and "destruction" are all qualified by the colour cognition.
Whenever we talk of desire, it is always of something. Similarly destruction, it is always for something. Similarly for being located in me, it is always something that is located in me. Therefore, each of those things are qualified by the cognition and qualify the cognition at the same time. Hence, they cannot be the objects of the cognition. Therefore, he adds a clause to the definition "but are not themselves qualified by the cognition" so that objects such as pots etc are picked up, but things like "desire etc" are excluded.
संबन्धेच्छादीनां संबन्धीष्यमाणाद्यवच्छिन्नस्वभावत्वादिति नातिव्याप्ति: As relationships such as desire etc are intrinsically linked with / in association with the items related, there is no ativyApti (they are not picked up by the definition).
ज्ञानविषयस्तु न ज्ञानावच्छिन्नस्वभाव:, The object of the cognition is not qualified by the cognition (they exist independently of their cognition)
ज्ञानस्य घटाद्यवच्छिन्नस्वभावत्ववत् घटादेर्ज्ञानावच्छिन्नस्वभावत्वादर्शनात् | For, it is seen that while the cognition is always qualified by its object such as pot, etc, the pot, etc. is not qualified by its cognition.
The next statement requires a bit of an introduction. The cognition of the pot is called vyavasAya jnAna, and the pot meta-cognition, i.e, cognition of the cognition of the pot is called anuvyavasAya jnAna. "I know a pot" is vyavasAya jnAna, "I know that I know the pot" is anuvyvasAya jnAna.
According to the bhATTa mImAmsa school, the cognition of cognition (anuvyasaAya jnAna) is inferred from the cognition, vyavasAya jnAna. They bhATTa-s argue that one can infer that one has had the cognition of the pot, from the cognition of the pot. We know that the pot cognition is related to the pot (ghaTa avacChinna), therefore it follows that the anuvyasAya jnAna of the pot cognition is related to the pot cognition (ghaTajnAna avacChinna). With that as the background, the nyAyAmRtakAra examines if the definition of being the object of cognition applies to anuvyavasAya jnAna:
यद्यपि स्वग्राहकज्ञानविषयीभूतं ज्ञानविषयकानुमित्यनुव्यवासायादिकं ज्ञानं ज्ञानावच्छिन्नस्वभावं ; Even though the inference, anuvyavasAya jnAna, which has the cognition of a thing (sva) as its object, and is itself qualified by the vyavasAya jnAna which objectifies that thing,
तथापि स्वयं यत् ज्ञानं प्रति विषयस्तदवच्छिन्नस्वभावं नेति नाव्याप्तिरिति the vyavasAya jnAna, which is the object of the anuvyavasAya jnAna, is not qualified by the latter. Therefore there is no under-extension of the definition for cognitions, which happen to be the object of meta-cognitions.
The definition of object, to put simply is - that which qualifies the cognition without requiring another relationship with the cognition, but is not itself qualified by the cognition. The meta-cognition of the pot has the cognition of the pot as its object. The cognition of the pot qualifies the meta-cognition of the pot, but the cognition of the pot is not itself qualified by the meta-cognition. Therefore, the definition of what constitutes an object applies to the objects of meta-cognitions too.
The siddhikAra responds to this.
- चेन्न; मत्समवेतं रूपज्ञानमित्याकारकज्ञानस्यात्मसमवायविषयकत्वाभावप्रसङ्गात् ;
This is not correct. Atma-samavAya (being located in me) is an object of the cognition "colour-cognition is located in me", but your definition does not apply to it.
According to nyAya, 'समवायस्तु एक एव' - there is only one samavAya sambandha universally. Thus the samavAya sambandha between me and colour-cognition, and the samavAya sambandha between me and the cognition "colour-cognition is located within me" are the same. samavAya sambandha is the qualifier for the cognition "colour-cognition is located in me".
Further, samavAya sambandha, which is a relationship between me and the cognition "colour-cognition is located in me", must be intrinsically qualified by both the elements in the relationship (any relationship is qualified by the items related). Therefore, samavAya is also qualified by the cognition "colour-cognition is located in me".
In other words, samavAya sambandha despite being the object of the cognition (colour-cognition is located in me), ends up being qualified by the same cognition that it qualifies, therefore the definition of being an object does not apply to samavAya sambandha.
आत्मसमवायस्य संबन्धत्वेन संबन्धिभूतस्वज्ञानावच्छिन्नत्वात्, As AtmasamavAya is a relationship, it is
qualified by the elements related, the cognition of the object (and me).
घटस्य ज्ञानमिति प्रतीत्या घटावच्छिन्नस्वभावत्वं यथा ज्ञानस्य, तथा ज्ञातो घट इति प्रतीत्या घटस्यापि ज्ञानावच्छिन्नस्वभावत्वेनासंभवाच्च | Like the nature of the pot-cognition as qualified by the pot is revealed in the notion "pot's cognition", the nature of the pot as qualified by the pot-cognition is revealed in the notion "the pot is known".
Therefore, even the pot would fail to be included in this definition of "being an object of cognition".
अथ - यज्ज्ञानं यदीयस्वभावं, स तस्य विषय:, मत्समवेतं रूपज्ञानमित्यत्र तु समवाय एव रूपज्ञानावच्छिन्नस्वभावो, न तु रूपज्ञानं तदवच्छिन्नस्वभावम् ; इदंच ज्ञानस्यैव विषयत्वमुक्तम्; नत्विच्छादिसाधारणमिति नाव्याप्तिरिति - चेन्न;
Therefore the statement -
"यज्ज्ञानं यदीयस्वभावं, स तस्य विषय:, The cognition of that which leads to the cognition being called "its cognition" is the object of the cognition.
When a pot is cognised, it is called घटस्य ज्ञानं, घटीयज्ञानं - the pot's cognition is pot-cognition. However the reverse, ज्ञानस्य घट:, is not used. This is because the pot is the object of cognition, the cognition is not an object of the pot.
मत्समवेतं रूपज्ञानमित्यत्र तु समवाय एव रूपज्ञानावच्छिन्नस्वभावो, न तु रूपज्ञानं तदवच्छिन्नस्वभावम् ; In the cognition "colour-cognition is located in me", it is the samavAya sambandha (located in me) alone which is qualified by the colour-cognition, the colour-cognition is not qualified by samavAya sambandha. That is, this is a cognition of colour-cognition having samavAya in me, not a cognition of "samavAya in me" having colour-cognition.
इदंच ज्ञानस्यैव विषयत्वमुक्तम्; नत्विच्छादिसाधारणमिति नाव्याप्तिरिति This is only establishing how cognition can be the object - it does not commonly apply to desires, and therefore there is no overextension.
The siddhikAra refutes this by saying इति चेन्न. When the possessive suffix was used (यदीय or the sixth case ending), that is denoting a relationship. What is that relationship?
यदीयस्वभावमिति तद्धितस्य यद्विषयकत्वार्थकत्वे आत्माश्रयात् , If the derived noun (taddhita) yadIya (whose cognition) denotes the object whose cognition is being referred to, then such a usage in the definition would make it self-referential (we are trying to define the relationship between cognition and object, and you are defining it by saying it is something which relations the cognition and the object).
अर्थान्तरस्य निरूपयितुमशक्यत्वात्, No other meaning can possible be attributed.
रूपज्ञानाभावाभावस्य रूपज्ञानरूपत्वेन रूपज्ञानस्याप्यभावीयतया तद्विषयत्वापत्ते: | As the absence of the absence of colour-cognition is the same as colour-cognition, the cognition of colour ends up having as its object, the the absence of colour cognition. To explain, the definition was यज्ज्ञानं यदीयस्वभावं, स तस्य विषय:. rupajnAna is rupajnAnAbhAvAbhAva: - or rUpajnAna ends up having rUpajnAnAbhAva as its object, abhAvIyatayA, as the absence of the absence of colour-cognition.
The nyAyAmRtakAra suggests the next possible definition of viShayatvam. He says:
ननु - ज्ञानजनककरणसन्निकर्षाश्रयत्वं तद्विषयत्वम्, Being an object of a cognition is being located in the contact with the instrument which gives to the cognition.
In nyAya, for the perception of any object requires contact between four substances - 1) Atma, the self, 2) Mind, 3) Sense organs and 4) the object. The Atma comes into contact (samyoga) with the mind, the mind with the sense organs, the sense organs with the object, leading to the notion "I see the pot".
Using this, the nyAyAmRtakAra says that viShayatva, which is located in that viShaya (the object) which has come into contact with the sense-organ. The sense organ is the jnAna janaka karaNa, the instrument that has given rise to the cognition. The sense organ coming into contact with an object is termed as jnAna janaka karaNa sannikarSha. viShayatva is that which is located in such an object, or jnAna janaka karaNa sannikarSha Ashrayatvam.
He refutes a couple of possible objections to such a definition.
नच रूपज्ञानकरणमनस्सन्निकर्षाश्रयस्यात्मनस्तद्विषयत्वापत्ति:,
Don't argue thus - the cognition of colour requires the contact of the eye with the object, the eye with the mind, and the mind with the self. If we take the instrument that gives rise to the cognition of colour as the mind, then contact of the mind is with the self. Such a definition could therefore lead to the self being the object of colour-cognition.
करणपदेनासाधारणज्ञानकरणस्यैव विवक्षितत्वात्, Because - by the word instrument in the definition, what is meant is the uncommon cause that gives rise to a specific type of knowledge. The eyes generate knowledge of sight alone, not sound, or smell, whereas the mind is the common cause for the cognition of sight, sound, smell, etc. The mind is not meant here by the word instrument for the locus of the contact with the instrument to refer to the self.
नच साधारणज्ञानकरणचक्षुसन्निकर्षाश्रयस्य मनसोऽपि रूपज्ञानविषयत्वापत्ति:, Nor can it be argued that as the eyes are in contact with the mind, the the mind to ends up becoming an object of the cognition of colour.
सन्निकर्षपदेनाप्यसाधारणज्ञानजनकसन्निकर्षस्यैवोक्तत्वादिति Because, the term contact in the definition refers to the unique contact which gives rise to cognition. For example, the object of pot-visual-cognition, is that which the eyes are uniquely in contact with, the pot. The contact between the eyes and the mind is common for every object seen, but the pot-cognition can only rise when there is contact between the eyes and the pot.
- चेन्न; चक्षुर्मनस्संयोगस्यापि चाक्षुषज्ञानासाधारणत्वेन मनसोऽपि चाक्षुषज्ञानविषयत्वापत्ते:, परोक्षविषये अव्याप्तेश्च |
The siddhikAra says - no.
As the contact between the eyes and the mind is a unique cause for visual-cognition, the mind too becomes the object for all visual-cognition. Further, in the case of indirect cognitions such as inference etc, there is no contact between the sense organ and the object of inference, so this definition will not apply to the objects of indirect cognitions.
नच - तत्र लिङ्गज्ञानं करणम्, तत्र च लिङ्गिन: तद्व्याप्तत्वं संबन्धोऽस्तीति - वाच्यम् ; Nor can it be said that the instrument in the case of inference etc is the cognition of the linga (hetu) in invariable concomitance, vyApti, with the lingi (sAdhya).
The object of the inference is fire. The instrument that gives rise to the inference is the invariable concomitance. The word लिङ्गं here refers to the hetu which is present in both the invariable concomitance and the paksha. The लिङ्गि is the sAdhya of the inference. The relation here is that the lingi is concomitant with the linga.
लिङ्गस्यापि स्वज्ञानसंबन्धित्वेनानुमितिविषयत्वापत्ते: | The hetu also ends up becoming the object of the inferential cognition as well - because, just like the sAdhya is concomitant with the hetu, the hetu is concomitant with itself too.
नचानुमितौ तद्व्याप्ततारूपसंबन्ध एव विषयतानियामक:,
Nor can it be argued that the factor that determines being an object of an inferential cognition is limited to that which appears to be invariably concomitant in the inference.
The inferential cognition is वह्निव्याप्य धूमवान् पर्वतः - the mountain is pervaded by smoke which is invariably concomitant with fire. When the inference arises, it arises because the invariable concomitance of the smoke with fire is what is invoked. The invariable concomitance of the smoke with itself, while true, is not what is invoked, giving rise to the inference of fire.
व्यापकतावच्छेदकव्यापकसंबन्धादीनाम् विषयत्वापत्ते: | To this the siddhikAra says no, because if you argue thus, the qualifiers that are necessary for being the inferred entity (vyApakatAvacChedakam) and the relation with the inferred entity (vyApakasambandha) would also end up the objects of the inferential cognition.
To explain - the fire (vyApaka) and the mountain have samyoga sambandha (are in contact). That they are in contact is known as a result of the concomitance. Similarly, the fire (vyApaka) that is inferred by the inference is known to be endowed with fire-ness (vyApakatAvacChedakam). If we say that everything that is known through the concomitance ends up the object of the concomitance, then the fire's contact with the mountain and the fire-ness of the fire would also end up as objects of the cognition.
In nyAya, cognition is of two types - cognition that arises (janya jnAna) and cognition that is eternal (nitya jnAna, i.e. Ishvara's cognition). Everything is an object to Ishvara's cognition. As it is eternal, it cannot have a cause, thus, if being an object is defined in terms of the accusative case, Ishvara's cognition will end up not having an object. To avoid this, the nyAyAmRtakAra postulates some refinements.
This is based on the definition of earth, prithivI. When heat is applied to earth, there is a change in its colour. Thus a definition of earth is postulated पाकजरूपवत्त्वं पृथिवीत्वम् - that which is endowed with colour born from heat is earth. However, it is said that a conch when subject to heat, does not change colour. However, the conch too is a product of earth. That being the case, to avoid the definition not applying to cases of earth which do not change colour, the logician defines earth as पाकजरूपसमानाधिकरणजातिमत्त्वम् - that which is endowed with a universal which is colocated with a colour born out of heat. However, this too suffers from the flaw that dravyatva, or substance-ness is also colocated with prithivItvam - and the definition can be extended to dravyatva. However dravyatva applies to water and the other elements also. Thus this is a case of over-extension. To avoid this, the phrase द्रव्यत्व व्याप्य (that universal which is a subset of dravyatva, substance-ness) is added to the definition. That is, every instance of the earth element is a substance, but every substance is not earth - thus by saying द्रव्यत्व व्याप्य, what is meant is a subset of substance-ness.
A similar approach is taken by the nyAyAmRtakAra. A pot becomes the object of a cognition born from the eyes. The object of the cognition is the avacChedaka or qualifier of the cognition. That is common to both our perception and Ishvara's perception.
नच - ज्ञानकरणसन्निकर्षसमानाधिकरणो ज्ञानावच्छेदकत्वसाक्षाद्व्याप्यधर्मो विषयत्वम्, इदंच नित्यपरोक्षसाधरणिमिति - वाच्यम् ;
The siddhikAra says: don't argue thus - "That which is colocated with the contact with the instrument of cognition, and that which is a direct subset of the qualifier-ness of the cognition is viShayatva, being the object of cognition. This definition applies commonly to cognitions of those objects which are eternally beyond the range of perception".
Why does the nyAyAmRtakAra adds the phrase "direct subset"? The pot is the qualifier (avacChedaka) to the pot-cognition. The attribute of "being the qualifier of cognition" (jnAna avacChedakatva) is present in the pot. Being a pot (ghaTatva) is a subset of jnAna avacChedakatva. That is, cognitions objectify many things, some of which are pots. Thus ghaTatva is present in a subset of those items that have jnAna avacChedakatva.
The nyAyA process of cognition, as we have discussed, is that the Atma and mind have samyoga, the mind and the sense organs have samyoga, the sense organs and the object have samyoga - this leads to the cognition "I see the object". The object is said to be jnAna avacChedaka, a qualifier of cognition. As the mind is in contact with the senses which are in contact with the object, it can also be said that that manatva is also a jnAna avacChedaka through a remote contact with the object. Therefore, to exclude chakshutva, manatva, Atmatva etc, the nyAyAmRtakAra says sAkshAt vyApya dharma (direct subset).
The siddhikAra responds to this by sayihg:
वस्तुत्वादिकमेव विषयत्वमित्यापत्ते:, All this means is that being a thing is being an object of cognition,
ज्ञानावच्छेदकत्वस्य रूपज्ञानाविषये समवायेऽपि सत्त्वेनातिव्याप्तेश्च | In the cognition of colour, as the samavAya too has the attribute of being the qualifier of the cognition, it will mean that the samavAya also ends up as an object of the cognition under this definition, which is a case of ativyApti, or over-extension.
In nyAya, if no sambandha can be defined between two entities which are somehow related, they classify the relation as a svarUpa sambandha. For example, the relationship between the pot and its absence is classified as svarUpa sambandha. Without a relationship between the pot and its absence, it would not be possible to claim "There is no pot here", but the relationship between the two cannot be classified into any other form of relationship. Hence, a new relationship called svarUpasambandha is postulated. The definition of svarUpasambandha is that it is indefinable, unclassifiable into any of the other types of sambandha.
नच - ज्ञानज्ञेययो: स्वरुपसंबन्ध एव विषयत्वमिति - वाच्यम् ; The siddhikAra says that one cannot argue that the relationship between cognition and its object is a case of svarUpasambandha either.
असिद्धे: | Because what is svarUpa sambandha is itself not proven.
तथाहि - स्वरूपसंबन्ध इत्यस्य सवरूपं संबन्ध इत्यर्थत्वे संयोगादावतिव्याप्ति:, If svarUpasambandha means that the nature (svarUpa) of it is that it is a relationship (sambandha), then such a definition would over-extend to samyogasambandha and samvavAya sambandha (ie if the svarUpa refers to samyoga and samavayAya then svarUpa sambandha would end up meaning samyoga sambandha and samavAya sambandha) - however samyoga and samavAya are not considered to be svarUpasambandha.
नच तदुभयान्यत्वं विशेषणम् ; Nor can it be said that svarUpasambandha is something other than the two objects being related.
हिमवद्विन्ध्ययोरपि स्वरूपसंबन्धापत्ते:, If it is simply something other than the two objects, then two unrelated entities like the Himalaya-s and the Vindhya mountain range can also be said to be connected by svarUpasambandha.
To remedy this, the pp says:
संबन्धान्तरमन्तरेण विशिष्टप्रतीतिजननयोग्यत्वं स्वरुपसंबन्ध इति चेन्न; If it is said that svarUpasambandha is that which leads to a cognition that two objects are related when there is no other relation between them.
आत्मानं जानामीत्यत्राव्याप्ते:, Because this definition would not apply to the cognition "I know myself", because the self is both the object of the cognition and the locus of the cognition - thus one cannot say that the cognition and its object have svarUpasambandha wherein no other sambandha is possible (because the locus - located relationship between the cognition and the self is present).
तत्र संबन्धान्तरस्य समवायस्यैव सत्त्वात् Because there is another sambandha, samavAya that is present.
अतीन्द्रियाभावादावव्याप्तेश्च, Moreover, this definition would also not apply to the absence of objects that are beyond the senses etc.
dharma / adharma are beyond the senses. The pot does not have dharma / adharma. The absence of adharma is present in the pot. There is no sambandha possible between this cognition and the absence of adharma. Therefore there is avyApti of this definition in the absence of atIndriya.
न हि तस्य विशिष्टप्रतितिजननयोग्यत्वे मानमस्ति | There is absolutely no basis to claim that they (the absence of objects beyond the senses) are capable of generating a cognition of relation.
अन्यथा तेन विशिष्टप्रत्ययजननापत्ते: | Otherwise we would be able to say so.
What is the relationship that you are referring to here?
किंच विशिष्टप्रतीतिजननयोग्यत्वं धर्मो वा संबन्ध:, तादृशस्वरूपद्वयमेव वा | 1) Is the relationship the attribute of being capable of generating a cognition of relation? 2) Or are the cognition and its object themselves together the relationship?
आद्ये स्वरूपस्य संबन्धत्वव्याघात:, In the first alternative, that the svarUpa of the cognition and its object (i.e., the cognition and the object themselves) are related is contradicted
प्रतीतिघटितस्यास्यचाक्षुषादिज्ञानागोचरत्वप्रसङ्गश्च | As the definition of svarUpa sambandha definition is inextricably linked with the cognition (of relation), the visual cognition of svarUpa sambandha would not be possible.
When the naiyyAyika postulates a svarUpa sambandha between the ground and the absence of the pot, he does so because of the cognition "I don't see the pot on the ground" - that is, the svarUpasambandha between the ground and the pot-absence is itself perceptible. Now, when svarUpasambandha between the ground and the absence of the pot is defined to be a capacity to generate a cognition of relation, then as that capacity is not perceptible, the svarUpasambandha would not be perceptible. However, as we have seen, the svarUpasambandha between the ground and the pot-absence is perceptible according to the naiyyAyika. Therefore, we will have a situation where the definition of svarUpasambandha will not apply in situations where the svarUpasambandha is visually perceptible.
न द्वितीय:, अननुगमात् | It cannot be the second alternative either, because if the two entities are themselves the svarUpasambandha, then as there are an infinite pairs of objects possible, there would no common definition of svarUpasambandha universally.
Continued here.